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This paper develops and implements a new test to investigate whether sell-side analysts herd around
the consensus when they make stock recommendations. Our empirical results support the herding
hypothesis. Stock price reactions following recommendation revisions are stronger when the new recommendation
is away from the consensus than when it is closer to it, indicating that the market recognizes analysts
tendency to herd. We find that analysts from larger brokerages and analysts following stocks with
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1. Introduction 
Media accounts and academic studies often attribute many market ills such as 
excess market volatility, the internet bubble and the emerging market meltdown in the 
nineties to the phenomenon of herding. The term “herding” refers broadly to the tendency 
of many different agents, who make their own individual decisions, to take similar 
actions at roughly the same time. Portfolio managers, stock analysts, individual investors, 
and corporate managers are among the many who have been portrayed as having been 
afflicted by herding instincts.  
Why do individuals herd? The theoretical and empirical literature in economics 
and finance offer many reasons.
1 One reason why individuals may herd is because they 
act based on similar information. Their information may be similar either because they all 
independently acquired signals that happen to be correlated, or they may have rationally 
extracted other agents’ information from their actions. Alternatively, individuals may 
herd because they derive utility from imitating others, either because of an inherent desire 
to conform
2 or because their financial incentive structure rewards conformity.    
An anecdotal example which is often cited as evidence of herding is the 
investment patterns during the latter half of the nineties, often referred to as the internet 
bubble period. During this period, mutual funds as a group invested an increasing portion 
of their assets in technology stocks. Even funds that traditionally invested in value stocks 
moved progressively towards investing in new economy stocks. One possible explanation 
for this herd behavior is that it is information driven. Funds may have optimally utilized 
                                                 
1 See Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and  Devenow and Welch (1996) for 
detailed surveys of the herding literature.     
2 The idea of irrational herding dates back at least to Keynes (1936), where he compares stock market to a 
beauty contest where judges voted on who they thought other judges would vote for.  
   2
the information available at that point in time (which includes others’ actions), and 
rationally anticipated unprecedented growth for internet stocks. Although in hindsight we 
know that such expectations were overly optimistic, it is hard to rule out the possibility 
that the internet stock prices were rational based on ex ante information available to 
investors. Alternatively, it is possible that many funds moved into internet stocks merely 
because of a desire to imitate their cohorts, although they truly believed that internet 
stocks were overvalued based on all available information.  
As this anecdote illustrates, it is generally hard to empirically differentiate 
between imitation and information-driven herding because we only observe the actions, 
but not the motives behind those actions or the information available to the actors. 
Nevertheless, the potential consequences of herding, and how observers should interpret 
others’ actions depends on that underlying driving force. For instance, if herding is 
information-driven, then herding behavior would not have the destabilizing effect on 
prices that is often attributed to it. Moreover, investors should rationally update their 
priors based on others’ actions if they do indeed contain new information.  
On the other hand, if herding is driven largely by a desire to imitate the actions of 
others, then herding forces may move prices away from fundamentals. Trueman (1994) 
presents an example where analysts herd to imitate other analysts. In Trueman’s model, 
analysts’ compensation depends on their abilities as perceived by their clients. Trueman 
shows that analysts with low abilities issue earnings forecasts that are close to those 
announced by other analysts in order to mimic high ability analysts and get a bigger 
compensation. Truman notes that in his model, “analysts exhibit herding behavior,  
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whereby they release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts, 
even when this is not justified by their information” (p. 97).   
Herding for the sake of imitation could potentially introduce noise in prices, 
which in turn may contribute to excess volatility that many view as undesirable. 
However, here again herding per se would not lead to excess volatility if the users of the 
information are aware of the herding incentives, and take those incentives into account in 
their trading decisions. For instance, in Trueman (1994), although the earnings forecasts 
are biased, they bring new information to the market. The bias would mislead investors 
about the value of the stock only if they take the forecast at face value. But, if the 
investors correctly adjust for the herding bias in earnings forecasts, then this bias would 
not translate into pricing errors. Therefore, to understand the broader consequences of 
any herding behavior, it is important that we not only focus on whether or not analysts or 
others herd, but also investigate whether the market recognizes the herding phenomenon, 
and acts accordingly.  
This paper examines whether sell-side analysts herd when they make stock 
recommendations.  We develop a simple model that allows us to specifically examine 
whether any herding behavior is driven by a desire to imitate. In addition, our model also 
allows us to draw inferences about whether the market recognizes analysts’ tendencies to 
deviate or conform at the time they make recommendation revisions. While the 
phenomenon of herding has been examined in a variety of contexts in the literature, this 
paper is the first to investigate whether the market recognizes herding behavior.
3   
                                                 
3 For instance, Graham (1999), Jaffe and Mahoney (1999), Desai et al. (2000), Hong et al. (2000), Welch 
(2000) and Clement and Tse (2005) examine herding among stock analysts and newsletters. Lamont (2002) 
and Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002) examine herding among macroeconomic forecasters and Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) examine herding among mutual fund managers.   
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   In related work, Welch (2000) examines whether analysts herd when they make 
investment recommendations. He develops a statistical model to investigate herding, and 
he finds that analysts are more likely to revise their recommendations towards prior 
consensus recommendations than away from them. However, as he notes, “Lacking 
access to the underlying information flow, I [Welch] cannot discern if the influence of 
recent revisions is either a similar response by multiple analysts to the same underlying 
information or is caused by direct mutual imitation” [Welch (2000), p. 393].   
In contrast, our paper empirically differentiates between imitation and 
information-based herding. While Welch’s tests are based on the likelihoods of 
recommendation revisions either moving towards or away from consensus, our tests are 
based on market price reactions to recommendation revisions. Therefore, we are able to 
not only test whether analysts herd without any assumptions about recommendation 
transition probabilities, but we are also able to draw inferences about whether the market 
recognizes analysts’ herding tendencies. 
Empirically differentiating between herding due to imitation and herding due to 
common information is generally difficult because they are both observationally similar 
in many respects. This difficulty is amply illustrated by the empirical literature that 
examines whether analysts herd towards the consensus when they issue forecasts. Early 
papers by Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), Lamont (2002), Gallo, Granger and Jeon 
(2002) and Clement and Tse (2005) examine the clustering of earnings or 
macroeconomic forecasts around consensus forecasts, and draw the conclusion that 
analysts herd towards the consensus, consistent with the model of Trueman (1994), 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and others.  De Bondt and Forbes (1999) find similar results  
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using UK data.  However, these papers do not adequately account for the fact that 
analysts may cluster around the consensus because both the consensus and the individual 
analyst’s forecast reflect similar information, and because analysts may attempt to extract 
and use information from the forecasts of others when they update their own forecasts. 
Subsequent papers by Zitzewtiz (2001), Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati 
(2006), and Chen and Jiang (2006) investigate herding behavior using methodologies that 
specifically account for such information effects. In marked contrast with earlier studies, 
these papers conclude that analysts “anti-herd,” or that they issue forecasts that are away 
from the consensus relative to a forecast conditional on analysts’ information set at the 
time of the forecast. For instance, Bernhardt et al. report that if an analyst’s revised 
forecast is above the consensus then it is more likely that the forecast would overshoot 
actual earnings than it would fall short of it, and the opposite is true when an analyst’s 
revised forecast is below the consensus. 
We present a simple model that captures analysts’ potential incentives to herd or 
exaggerate their differences with the consensus. In our model, analysts optimally revise 
their stock recommendations based on their private information, and the market prices 
efficiently reflect all publicly available information including consensus 
recommendations and analysts’ recommendation revisions. We show that price reactions 
to analysts’ recommendation revisions are unrelated to consensus recommendations if 
analysts optimally revise their recommendations solely based on new information, 
without attempting to imitate other analysts’ old recommendations. We also show that 
stock price reactions would be positively related to how far analysts’ new  
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recommendations deviate from the consensus if analysts have an incentive to herd and 
negatively related if analysts have a disincentive to herd.  
We use the results of our model to investigate whether analysts tend to herd or 
anti-herd when they revise their stock recommendations. We also examine the relation 
between analysts’ tendency to herd and their experience and the reputation of their 
employer. Theoretical models by Trueman (1994) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
predict that analysts with lower reputation are more likely to herd because of career 
concerns or because of their desire to imitate others with better abilities. In contrast, 
Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) model predicts that inexperienced analysts are more likely 
to exaggerate their differences so that they stand out from the crowd and appear talented.
4  
The empirical results in the literature offer mixed support for the predictions of 
these models. Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Hong et al. (2000), and Clement and Tse 
(2005) present results that suggest less experienced analysts are more likely to herd. 
However, Zitzewitz (2001) presents tests that control for information effects and shows 
that less experienced analysts actually exaggerate their differences from the consensus. 
Unlike these papers, our tests are based on market’s interpretation of any relation 
between herding and reputation, and our results offer a different perspective. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model that 
lays the foundation for our empirical tests. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 
presents the empirical tests. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
                                                 
4 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) also point out that analysts’ may earn wages that are higher than outside 
alternatives for experienced analysts, which could enhance the herding incentives.  
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2. Model 
This section presents the model that provides the basis for our empirical tests. Our 
model has two periods, 0 and 1. Suppose the price of a stock at time 0 is 0 P . Consider a 
sell-side analyst who makes investment recommendation about this stock. The 
unconditional distribution of the stock price at time 1 is given by: 
, 0 1 ε + = P P  where  ) , 0 ( ~
2
ε σ ε N    (1) 
The sell-side analyst observes a private noisy signal. He updates his priors about 
the time 1 price for the stock, and his posterior 0 S , conditional on his signal is:      
01, SP η =+     (2) 
where, η is noise, and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
η σ η N . The distribution of ε  and η are common 
knowledge.
5  
After the analyst observes his private signal, he has to decide whether to upgrade, 
downgrade or make no revision to his investment recommendation of the stock. First, 
consider a situation where there is no incentive for herding. Suppose the analyst’s 
compensation C is a function of the relation between the direction of future price and the 
direction of his recommendation revision. Specifically, his compensation is: 
), 1 ( D D C − ⋅ − ⋅ + = γ β α    (3) 
where D = 1 if future price change for the stock is in the same direction as the analyst’s 
recommendation revision, and 0 otherwise. The parametersα ,β , andγ  are positive 
constants.  Since the compensation function rewards skill, the analyst should not have an 
incentive to make a revision based on no information. Therefore, the penalty for a wrong 
                                                 
5 Our main results obtain also when we assume that only the analyst knows the precision of his signal, and 
not the market.   
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call exceeds the reward for a correct call, i.e. β γ < .  If he makes no revisions, his 
compensation would beα , which is known at time 0. 
The analyst revises his recommendation only if the expected payoff conditional 
on a revision exceedsα . The proposition below describes the analyst’s optimal rule for 
recommendation revision.  
Proposition 1a: The analyst’s optimal recommendation revision rule is: 
      Upgrade if   ; 0 0 η σ k P S + ≥  
  Downgrade if   ; 0 0 η σ k P S − ≤  and 
  No revision otherwise.             (4) 








,                    (5) 
and Φis the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
If the analyst revises his recommendation, then the market rationally incorporates that 
information into prices. The proposition below presents the market price conditional on a 
recommendation revision.     
Proposition 1b: The stock price conditional on an upgrade is: 
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           (6) 
whereφ  is the standard normal density function, , and 
2 2
η ε εη σ σ σ + = . 
Proof: See Appendix.  
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In our model, the analyst conveys his information through an upgrade or a 
downgrade. Because our model assumes market efficiency, the particular label that the 
analyst attaches to the recommendation per se, i.e. whether it is a buy, a hold or a sell, 
does not convey any incremental information. Essentially,  0 P  incorporates all public 
information including the analyst’s recommendation level prior to any revision. 
Empirical evidence in Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) and others indicates that 
recommendation levels do not contain any information about future returns and supports 
this assumption.
6 
Now, consider the case where the analyst has either an incentive or a disincentive 
to herd with the consensus. We incorporate any incentives or disincentives to herd in the 
analyst’s compensation function, which we specify as:  
, ) ( ) 1 (
2 Consensus Rec D D C new − − − ⋅ − ⋅ + = δ γ β α  (7) 
where  new Rec is the analyst’s new recommendation level and Consensusis the average 
recommendation level of all the other analysts.  If he makes no revisions, his 
compensation would be  . ) (
2 Consensus Rec C old − − = δ α  
The compensation function (7) is a reduced form characterization of the 
incentives to herd or to exaggerate differences, and it is similar to the objective function 
that Zitzewitz (2001) uses in the context of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Incentives to 
herd arise endogenously in Trueman (1994), and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996). In these 
models, analysts herd to mimic their more skilled counterparts. It is also possible that 
analysts herd because they perceive it to be a safe course of action. After all, if their 
                                                 
6 In unreported results, we found that recommendation levels are not related to future returns in our sample 
as well, and hence any information in recommendation levels is fully reflected in stock prices.   
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predictions turn out to be wrong when they herd, then their cohorts would be wrong as 
well. Regardless of the underlying reason, when analysts have an incentive to herd,  0 δ >  
in the analyst’s compensation function (7).  
Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model where the opposite incentives are 
present. In their model, agents who have not yet established a reputation for themselves, 
or the “newcomers,” overemphasize their own information and exaggerate their 
differences with others to appear talented. Similarly, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) show 
that when analysts view their tasks as a winner-take-all contest, then they have an 
incentive to excessively differentiate their views from those of other analysts. When 
analysts were faced with incentives to deviate from the crowd, or to “anti-herd”, 0 δ < .   
The proposition below describes the analyst’s optimal rule for recommendation 
revision when his compensation function is given by (7).  
Proposition 2a: The analyst’s optimal recommendation revision rule is: 
  Upgrade if   ; ) ( 0 0 η σ θ + + ≥ k P S  
  Downgrade if   ; ) ( 0 0 η σ θ + − ≤ k P S  and 
  No revision otherwise.          (8) 
where θ  is determined by the equation   
) (














Consensus Rec Consensus Rec
k
old new .   (9)  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Now the analyst’s decision whether to revise his recommendation depends not only on 
his signal but also on how far away his recommendation would be from the consensus. 
Since the market rationally recognizes these incentives, the price reaction subsequent to a  
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revision would reflect the analyst’s decision rule. The proposition below presents the 
market price conditional on a recommendation revision.     
Proposition 2b: The stock price conditional on an upgrade is: 
   [] )] ( ) [( 1
)] ( ) [(
Upgrade | 0 , 0
εη η
εη η
εη σ σ θ
σ σ θ φ
σ





P P up ; and 
   [] )] ( ) [( 1
)] ( ) [(
Downgrade | 0 , 0
εη η
εη η
εη σ σ θ
σ σ θ φ
σ





P P up       (10) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
When there are incentives or disincentives to herd, the market price reaction is a 
function of not only whether the analyst upgrades or downgrades his recommendation, 
but also how far the recommendation is from the consensus. This relation is formally 
described in the proposition below. 
Proposition 3a: The price reaction to recommendation revision is stronger when, relative 
to the old recommendation, the new recommendation moves away from the consensus 
than when it moves towards the consensus if the analyst has an incentive to herd (i.e. if 
0 δ > ).  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 3b: The expected return following recommendation revision is: 
(a) Positively related to the deviation between the analyst’s recommendation and the 
consensus if the analyst has an incentive to herd (i.e. if  0 δ > );  and  
(b) Negatively related to the deviation between the analyst’s recommendation and the 
consensus if the analyst has an incentive to deviate from the herd (i.e. if  0 δ < ).  
Proof: See Appendix.  
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Proposition 3a and 3b form the basis for our empirical tests. Our tests use market price 
reactions to investigate herding. In contrast, prior research on herding typically attempts 
to set empirical benchmarks for how agents would behave in the absence of herding. For 
instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) report that less experienced managers deviate less 
from benchmark index than more experienced managers, and conclude that less 
experienced managers herd more because of career concerns. Here the experienced 
managers’ deviation from the index is used as a benchmark for the less experienced 
managers. However, it is quite possible that less experienced analysts stay closer to the 
benchmark because they are not as talented as the more experienced managers. As this 
example illustrates, when there are differences across agents in skill or in access to 
information, it is difficult specify how one set of agents should behave based on the 
actions of another set of agents and draw reliable inferences about herding.  
  Since we base our tests on market price reactions, we rely on market efficiency 
and we do not need to specify a model that focuses on the transition probabilities for 
recommendation revisions. Our model predicts that if recommendation revisions are 
driven solely by new information, then market price reaction would not depend on the 
distance between the consensus and new recommendations.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
We obtain the stock recommendations data from the IBES detailed US 
recommendations file; earnings announcement dates from the IBES actual earnings file; 
and stock returns and index returns from daily CRSP. The sample period is from 
November 1993 to December 2005.   
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Most commonly, analyst recommendations rate stocks as “strong buy,” “buy,” 
“hold,” “sell,” and “strong sell.”'  Analysts also use other labels such as “market 
underperform” and “market outperform,” or “underweight” and “overweight,” to convey 
their opinions, but IBES standardizes the recommendations, and converts them to 
numerical scores where “1” is strong buy, “2”' is buy, and so on. To map an upgrade to a 
positive number and a downgrade to a negative number, we reverse IBES’ numerical 
scores so that “1” would correspond to a strong sell and “5” would correspond to a strong 
buy. 
Our sample comprises all stocks that satisfy the following criteria: 
(a)  There should be at least one analyst who issues a recommendation for the 
stock and revises the recommendation within 180 calendar days
7. 
(b)  At least two analysts, other than the revising analyst, should have active 
recommendations for the stock as of the day before the revision. 
(c)  The stock return data on the recommendation revision date should be available 
on CRSP; and 
(d)  The stock price should be at least $1 on the day before the recommendation 
revision date. 
(e)  Recommendation revisions should be only one level up or down. That is, 
absolute difference between the previous recommendation and the new 
recommendation level should be one. For instance, we exclude all revisions 
where analysts upgrade from hold to strong buy because the revision spans 
                                                 
7 IBES also provides stopped dates of the coverage for each stock and brokerage pair.  We filter out 
revisions that are made after the closest stopped date since the previous recommendation.   
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two levels, buy and strong buy. We impose this exclusion criterion to ensure 
consistency with our model.
8,9 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. The number of firms in 
the sample ranges from a low of 139 in 1993 to a high of 1,783 in 2002. The sample size 
is relatively small in 1993 largely because IBES coverage is incomplete in its first year. 
The median number of analysts following a firm over the entire sample period is five. 
The number of brokerages in database increases from 32 in 1993 to 145 in 2004 before 
decreasing to 140 in 2005. The brokerages in the sample range from large brokerages like 
Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley to small ones that have only one analyst on IBES. The 
median number of analysts in a brokerage is four.  
 
4. Empirical Tests  
  Our first set of tests examines stock price changes following recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades over various horizons. We use the results from our model to 
investigate whether stock price reactions to analysts’ recommendation revisions indicate 
herding behavior.  We then examine the cross-sectional relation between experience and 
reputation, and analysts’ tendency to herd.  Finally, we examine the robustness of our 
results to alternate test specifications.      
 
4.1 Price Reaction to Recommendation Revisions 
This subsection examines how stock prices react to recommendation revisions. 
We characterize each revision as an upgrade or a downgrade by comparing the revised 
                                                 
8  Sorescu and Subrahmanyam(2006) report that the market reactions are stronger for two level revisions 
than for one level revisions. 
9 Our empirical results, however, do not change when we include multiple level revisions in the sample.   
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recommendation with the previous active recommendation for the stock by the revising 
analyst.  
After a recommendation revision for stock i on date t, we compute H-day buy-
and-hold abnormal returns ( , ) i ABR t t H +  as follows: 








=           (11) 
where,  ,, and  im R R τ τ are the return on stock i and the value-weighted index return, 
respectively. 
Table 2 presents abnormal stock returns over various horizons following 
recommendation revisions. Day 0 is the revision date and the other days in the column 
headings are the number of trading days from the revision date. For instance, the entries 
under the column heading “21” presents cumulative abnormal returns over 21 trading 
days, or roughly one calendar month, after the revision.  We compute serial-correlation 
consistent Hansen and Hodrick standard error estimates allowing for non-zero serial 
correlation for up to 6 months to take into account that the return measurement intervals 
overlap across longer horizons.  
The average abnormal return on the revision date is 2.03% for all upgrades and           
- 3.14% for all downgrades. The abnormal return gradually increases to 4.85% by the end 
of the sixth months for upgrades and decreases to –3.45% for downgrades. Therefore, a 
large part of stock price response occurs on the day of the revision although the market 
prices continue to reflect the information in recommendation revisions up to six months  
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into the future. These results are consistent with the previous literature that examines the 
impact of analysts’ recommendations on stock prices.
10  
Table 2 also presents abnormal returns separately for recommendation revisions 
that move towards the consensus and those that move away from the consensus. We 
define consensus recommendation level as the equal-weighted average of all active 
recommendations that are outstanding for the stock as of the day before the revision, 
excluding the revising analysts’ recommendation. We include a revision in the sample 
only if at least two analysts beside the revising analyst have active recommendations.  
We consider a recommendation to be active for up to 180 days after it is issued or until 
IBES stopped file records that the analyst has stopped issuing recommendations for that 
stock. We impose the 180-day criterion to screen out stale recommendations.  We 
categorize a revision as moving away from the consensus if the absolute value of 
deviation from the consensus is larger for the new recommendation than for the old 
recommendation, and moving towards the consensus otherwise.
11   
The results in Table 2 indicate that the market reaction is stronger for revisions 
that move away from the consensus than for those that move towards it.  For upgrades, 
the difference in abnormal returns is significant on the revision date. Because longer 
horizon returns are noisier, we do not detect any reliable difference in returns over 
horizon beyond two months. For downgrades, the differences between returns are much 
larger and have a longer lasting effect.  These results are consistent with the predictions 
of our model under herding hypothesis and suggest that the market rationally takes into 
                                                 
10 For example, Womack (1996), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2006). 
11 In 985 revisions (2% of the sample), the absolute deviation is the same before and after the revision.  We 
exclude these revisions when we present stock price reactions in Table 2 for revisions that move away from 
or towards the consensus.  
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account the herding incentives of sell side analysts when they make recommendation 
revisions and prices them accordingly.   
However, the analysis in this subsection considers only a binary classification of 
potential indication of herding; movement towards or away from the consensus.  Our 
model also provides predictions regarding the relationship between the magnitude of the 
move towards or away from the consensus and expected returns, which we expect to be 
more powerful in testing the herding hypothesis.  We now examine these predictions in 
more detail. 
 
4.2 Herding Regressions 
We use the following regression specification to investigate whether analysts herd: 
H t j i t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR , , , 1 , , , ) _ _ ( ) , ( ε + − × + × + = + −              (12) 
where,  
I = +1 if the revision is an upgrade 
  =  -1 if the revision is a downgrade 
The indicator variable I takes the sign of expected abnormal returns conditional 
on an upgrade or a downgrade. We use this indicator variable so that we can pool 
upgrades and downgrades in the same regression.  
The variable  t j i rec New , , _  is the recommendation level after the revision for stock 
i by analyst j on day t.  If there are multiple revisions on any day t for stock i, then we 
treat each revision as a separate observation.
12  The variable  ,1 _ it Con rec −  is the 
                                                 
12 About 7% of the sample are related with multiple revisions on a same day.  
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consensus recommendation the day before the revision, excluding the revising analyst’s 
recommendation.  
This regression specification is based on the results of our model given in 
Equation (9) and (10). As Equation (9) and (10) indicate, if analysts were either herding 
or exaggerating their differences, then the stock return on the revision date would not 
only depend on the information in the revision per se, but also on whether the 
recommendation is closer to or away from the consensus recommendation. As we discuss 
in Proposition 3b, stock price reaction would be positively related to the deviation from 
the consensus if analysts herd, and would be negatively related if they exaggerate.
13  
Therefore, our alternate hypotheses are: 
A1. Herding: Analysts have an incentive to herd close to the consensus when they 
make recommendation revisions. Therefore,  0 c > . 
A2. Exaggeration: Analysts have an incentive to exaggerate their differences with 
the consensus when they make recommendation revisions. Therefore,  0 c < . 
For convenience, we will be referring to c as the herding coefficient in the 
subsequent analysis.  We fit Regression (12) for holding periods ranging from one day to 
about six-months. By allowing for holding period longer than just the day of revision, we 
can examine whether market reaction recognizes any herding incentives on the revision 
date or with some delay. For instance, if analysts tend to herd, but the immediate market 
reaction does not take herding into account, then the coefficient c would be zero on the 
revision date but it would be positive over longer horizons as the information in deviation 
                                                 
13 We resort to  ) _ _ ( 1 , , , − − t i t j i rec Con rec New  as the main explanatory variable rather than directly use 
2
, , , ) _ _ [( t i l t j i rec Con rec New − − -  I rec Con rec Old t i l t j i * ] ) _ _ (
2
, , , − − , since this quantity is equivalent 
to  I rec Con rec New t i t j i − − − ) _ _ ( 2 1 , , , when revisions are only one level up or down.  
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from consensus gets reflected in market prices. However, if coefficient c is not different 
from zero over any holding period, then we would not be able to reject the null 
hypothesis of no herding or exaggeration.           
Table 3 presents the estimates of Regression (12) using the Fama-MacBeth 
approach. Specifically, we estimate a separate regression using all revision data within 
each calendar quarter. The regression estimates and t-stats are based on the time-series 
averages and standard errors of the corresponding quarterly regression coefficients.  
There are a total of 49,255 revisions in our sample. The slope coefficient on the 
revision indicator on day 0 is 2.05, indicating that the average stock return is 2.05% in the 
direction of recommendation revision. This slope coefficient increases gradually with the 
holding period, reflecting the delay in market price reactions to recommendation 
revisions. 
The slope coefficient on deviation from consensus is .75, which is significantly 
positive. Therefore, in addition to the direction of recommendation revision, the deviation 
from consensus also conveys information to the market. The stock return is more positive 
for upgrades and more negative for downgrades when the new recommendation moves 
farther away from the consensus than when it moves closer to it. As we discussed earlier, 
the positive coefficient supports the hypothesis that analysts herd towards the consensus. 
The point estimates of the slope coefficients on deviation from consensus are .70 
and .88 for two- and six-month holding periods, respectively. Although these point 
estimates are smaller and larger than the corresponding slope coefficient on the revision 
date return regression, the differences are not statistically significant. Therefore, the  
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market price fully incorporates the information in the deviation from consensus on the 
revision date.        
Analysts’ tendency to herd may be different for upgrades and downgrades. For 
instance, analysts may be more reluctant to stand out from the herd for downgrades since 
they are typically reluctant to be negative on a stock.
14 To investigate whether analysts  
herd differently for upgrades versus downgrades, we fit the following regression: 
   ) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR       
                       H t j i t j i t i t j i H dummy downgrade rec Con rec New d , , , , , 1 , , , _ ) _ _ ( ε + × − × + −    (13) 
where  downgrade_dummyi,j,t equals 1 for downgrades and 0 for upgrades.   
Table 4 reports the regression estimates. The slope coefficient on the herding 
coefficients for downgrade dummy is .90, which is significantly greater than zero. 
Therefore, analysts tend to herd more for downgrades than for upgrades.        
 
4.3 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Herding 
This subsection examines the factors that are related to analysts’ tendency to herd. 
In the models of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) inexperienced agents are more likely to 
herd because of career concerns. In contrast, Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a 
model where “newcomers” exaggerate their differences more than well established 
employees in order to stand out from the crowd and appear talented.  Empirical evidence 
offers mixed support for these predictions. For example, Hong et al. (2000), Clement and 
Tse (2005), and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that less experienced analysts and 
mutual fund managers are more likely to herd. On the other hand, Zitzewitz (2001) 
                                                 
14 Analysts’ reluctance to issue negative opinion is evident in the distribution of their recommendations. For 
example, Barber, LeHavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) report that only 5.7% of the analysts’ 
recommendations in their sample were sell or strong sell.   
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reports that more experienced analysts are more likely to herd when they make earnings 
forecasts, after accounting for information effects. This subsection uses price reactions to 
analysts’ recommendation revisions to investigate analysts’ tendency to herd from the 
market’s perspective.  
We use two measures of analysts’ professional reputation. The first measure is the 
length of time that the analyst is on the IBES database. The second measure is the size of 
the brokerage that employs the analyst since larger brokerages are more established and 
prestigious. We measure the size of the brokerage by the number of analysts who are on 
the IBES database from that brokerage each year.  
We also examine the relation between analysts’ tendency to herd and the 
dispersion of analysts’ outstanding recommendation prior to the revision. We expect that 
if recommendations are dispersed analysts will have less of an incentive to herd because 
they do not stand out as much when their opinion deviates from the average.  
  We use the following regression to test the relation between herding and various 
characteristics:  
) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR  
                                    t j i t i t j i H dummy char rec Con rec New d , , 1 , , , _ ) _ _ ( × − × + −   
                                    H t j i t j i H dummy char I e , , , , , _ ε + × × +            (14) 
where  t j i dummy char , , _  is a dummy variable for each characteristic. The dummy variable 
for analysts’ experience equals 1 if the analyst has more than three years of experience. 
The dummy variable for brokerage reputation equals 1 if the number of analyst is 
employed by a top 20 brokerage the previous year, based on the number of analysts 
employed by the brokerage. The cross-sectional dispersion dummy equals 1 if the  
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standard deviation of the consensus recommendation prior to the revision is greater than 
0.75, which is the average dispersion in the sample.
 15  We also include an additional 
independent variable that interacts each dummy variable with I to examine whether the 
characteristic directly affects market response to recommendation revisions.  
Table 5 reports the estimates of  regression (14). Panels A, B, and C report results 
for analyst experience, brokerage size, and pre-revision dispersion in recommendations, 
respectively. The results from panel A indicate that the tendency to herd does not differ 
across analysts depending on their experience.
16 In contrast, Clement and Tse (2005) and 
Zitzewitz (2001) find evidence of herding and anti-herding when analysts revise their 
earnings forecasts.  
Panel B uses brokerage size as a measure of reputation. The herding coefficient 
on brokerage size dummy is significantly positive, which indicates that analysts from 
large brokerages tend to herd more than analysts from small brokerages. This finding 
suggests that analysts from the less prestigious brokerage may try to stand out from the 
crowd to attract attention, and it is consistent with the predictions of Prendergast and 
Stole (1996).  
Panel C examines the relation between cross-sectional dispersion in 
recommendations and analysts’ tendency to herd. The herding coefficient of the 
dispersion dummy is significantly negative, which indicates that analysts are less likely to 
herd when there is a large dispersion across analysts’ opinion. This result is consistent 
with our prediction.  
 
                                                 
15 The sample mean of cross-sectional dispersion in recommendations is 0.75 and the median is 0.753. 
16 The sub-sample used in panel A only includes those revisions that are made at least three years after the 
beginning of the sample period so that we have at least a three-year history of employment.   
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4.4 Robustness Check 
This subsection examines the robustness of our results to various changes in our 
sample selection criteria. Analysts use a variety of different information when they arrive 
at their recommendations. For instance, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) note that analysts’ 
recommendations immediately following earnings announcements are likely to be based 
on their interpretation of financial data that the firm announces while their 
recommendations at other times are likely to be based on information that they privately 
gather.  
To examine whether analysts’ tendency to herd differs depending on the timing of 
their revisions, we estimate regression (12) excluding revisions made within three days 
before and after the earnings announcement date. Panel A of Table 6 presents the 
regression estimates.
17 We find that the herding coefficients now are quite similar to the 
estimates we report in Table 3 for the full sample.  
It is possible that revisions made by two analysts close to one another are driven 
by common information.  Therefore, we re-estimate regression (12) for a sample of 
revisions that are made at least five days after the most recent revision by a different 
analyst.  These results are also quite similar to the full sample results. 
Next, we exclude revisions that move across the consensus. For example, if an 
analyst upgrades from 3 to 4 when the consensus is 3.3 it may not be an unambiguous 
move away from the consensus. Panel C of Table 6 presents the regression estimates for 
this restricted subsample. Here again, the results are quite similar to the full sample 
results both in magnitude and significance of the coefficients. 
                                                 
17 We lose roughly a quarter of our sample when we exclude the seven-day earnings announcement window 
since analysts’ recommendation revisions tend to cluster within this event window.     
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Finally, we investigate the possibility that the herding coefficient is significant not 
because of the deviation from consensus, but because of the information contained in the 
new recommendation level.  To examine this possibility, we fit the following regression:  
) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR  
                                    H t j i t j i H t j i H StrongBuy e StrongSell Sell d , , , , , , , _ ε + × + × +       (15) 
where  t j i StrongSell Sell , , _  is a dummy variable equal to1 if the new recommendation is a 
sell or a strong sell and 0 otherwise, and  t j i StrongBuy , ,  is a dummy variable equal to1 if 
the new recommendation is a strong buy and 0 otherwise.  
Table 7 presents the estimates of regression (15). The slope coefficient on the 
_ Sell StrongSell dummy is significantly positive on the revision date, while that on 
theStrongBuy, is significantly negative. These results indicate that downgrades or 
upgrades to these levels are less informative than others. However, the herding 
coefficient is significantly positive, and of similar magnitude to the corresponding 
coefficients in Table 3.  Therefore the information contained in the deviation from the 
consensus is orthogonal to the level of recommendations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines whether sell-side analysts herd when they make stock 
recommendations.  We develop a model that allows us to specifically examine whether 
any herding behavior is driven by a desire to imitate. In addition, our model allows us to 
draw inferences about whether the market recognizes analysts’ tendencies to deviate from 
or conform to the consensus at the time they make recommendation revisions. While the  
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phenomenon of herding has been examined in a variety of contexts in the literature, this 
paper is the first to investigate whether the market recognizes herding behavior. 
We find that the market reaction to analysts’ recommendation revision is stronger 
when the revised recommendations move away from the consensus than when they move 
towards the consensus. Our results are robust to a variety of controls.  Our results indicate 
that recommendation revisions are partly driven by analysts’ desire to herd with the 
crowd.  
We find stronger herding effects for downgrades than for upgrades, which 
suggests that analysts are more reluctant to stand out from the crowd when they convey 
negative information. We also find that analysts from more reputed brokerages are more 
likely to herd than analysts from less reputed brokerages. This finding supports the 
prediction of Prendergast and Stole (1996) that “new comers,” which in our context 
represents analysts from less prestigious brokerages, are more likely to stand out from the 
crowd than well established agents.  
Media accounts and some academic papers have suggested that analysts’ herding 
tendencies could introduce noise into prices because the market could potentially 
overweight the common mistakes of the herd. However, our results indicate that the 
market anticipates analysts’ tendencies to herd, and the market price reaction on the 
revision date accounts for such herding tendencies. Therefore, we doubt that herding by 
analysts when they make recommendations would have any destabilizing effect on prices.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1a 
Let  
] | Pr[ 0 0 1 S P P X > = .     (A.1) 
The condition for issuing an upgrade is given by;  










S P P X .               (A.3) 






= Φ k      (A.4) 
whereΦis the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
Since ) , ( ~ |
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) ( 0 0 .  Therefore, the analyst  
optimally upgrades his recommendation when  η σ k P S + > 0 0 . The optimal rule for 
issuing downgrades can be similarly determined.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1b 
The expected stock price conditional on observing an upgrade is given by; 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 , 0 ) | ( ) | ( Upgrade |
0
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.             (A.5) 
From the market’s perspective,  η ε + + = 0 0 P S  so that  ) , ( ~
2 2
0 0 η ε σ σ + P N S . 
Then, based on the properties of the normal distribution, it can be shown that, 
() [][] )] ( [ 1
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εη η
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εη εη η εη η σ σ
σ σ φ
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⋅ Φ −
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P k P k P S S E     (A.6) 
where 
2 2
η ε εη σ σ σ + = , φ  is the density function and 
) 1 ( Φ −
=
φ
λ is the hazard function 
of standard normal distribution or inverse Mill’s ratio.
18   
 
Similarly, the expected stock price conditional on observing a downgrade is given by; 
() [][] )] ( [ 1
)] ( [
) | ( 0 0 0 0 0
εη η
εη η
εη εη η εη η σ σ
σ σ φ
σ σ σ λ σ σ
⋅ Φ −
⋅
− = ⋅ − = − <
k
k
P k P k P S S E      (A.7) 
                                                 
18 See for example, Greene, W. H., 2000, Econometric Analysis, 4
th edition, Chap 20, Prentice Hall for 
detailed discussion.  
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Proof of Proposition 2a 
Let ] | Pr[ 0 0 1 S P P X > = .  Now, the analyst issues an upgrade if: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( Consensus Rec Consensus Rec X old new − − > − − − + + δ α δ γ γ β α               (A.8) 
Therefore, 
) (













Consensus Rec Consensus Rec
S P P X
old new  (A.9) 
Define θ such that: 
) (
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old new .             (A.10) 
Since ) , ( ~ |
2
0 0 1 η σ S N S P , Eq. (A.10) implies that  ) (






.  Therefore, an  
analysts upgrades his recommendation when  00 () SPk η θ σ >++ . The optimal rule for 
downgrades can be similarly determined.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2b 
The expected stock price conditional on observing an upgrade is now given by; 
0 0 0
) (
0 0 0 0 0 , 0 ) ) ( | ( ) ) ( | ( Upgrade |
0
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By Proposition 1b, it follows that, 
( ) [ ] εη η εη η σ σ θ λ σ σ θ ⋅ + + = + + > ) ( ) ) ( | ( 0 0 0 0 k P k P S S E  
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P                                   (A.12)  
Similarly, the expected stock price conditional on a downgrade is:  
( ) [ ] εη η εη η σ σ θ λ σ σ θ ⋅ + − = + − < ) ( ) ) ( | ( 0 0 0 0 k P k P S S E  
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P                                   (A.13)  
 
Proof of Proposition 3a 
A move away from the consensus implies that 
] ) ( ) [(
2 2 Consensus Rec Consensus Rec old new − − −  is positive.  Suppose that analysts have 
incentives to herd so that  0 > δ .  Then,  from Eq. (A.10),  0 > θ .  Similarly, a movement  
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towards the consensus implies that  . 0 < θ   Based on the properties of normal distribution, 
it follows that, 
) 1 , 0 ( ] ) ( )[ ( ) ( ' ∈ − = α α λ α λ α λ .    (A.14) 
Thus, according to Eq. (A.12) and (A.13), positive θ  implies a higher expected price for 
upgrades and a lower expected price for downgrades and negative θ  leads to a lower 
expected price for upgrades and a higher expected price for downgrades 
 
Proof of Proposition 3b 
Let  
) ( old new Rec Rec − = ∆ ,                                                                                    (A.15) 
and  
) (   Consensus Rec Deviation new − = .                                                                (A.16)   
Then, it follows that  
= − − − ] ) ( ) [(
2 2 Consensus Rec Consensus Rec old new [ ] ∆ − ⋅ ∆ Deviation 2       (A.17) 
 
For upgrades, Deviation would increase as the analyst first moves towards the consensus 
and then away from it for given levels of ∆ and Consensus.  Since  0 > ∆ , an increases in 
Deviation implies an increase in  ] ) ( ) [(
2 2 Consensus Rec Consensus Rec old new − − − .  From 
Eq. (A.10), this implies an increase θ  when  0 > δ .  It follows from Eq. (A.12) and 
(A.14) that an increase in θ  implies a higher expected price. 
 
For downgrades, Deviation would decrease as the analyst first moves towards the 
consensus and then away from it.  Since  0 < ∆ , a decrease in Deviation implies an 
increase in  ] ) ( ) [(
2 2 Consensus Rec Consensus Rec old new − − − .  Then, based on Eq. (A.10), 
(A.13) and (A.14), this implies increases in θ  and a lower expected price when  0 > δ . 
 
Thus, Deviation and expected returns would be positively related for both upgrades and 
downgrades. The opposite result obtains when analysts have incentives to anti-herd (i.e. 
if  0 δ < ). 
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample includes all firms 
that have at least two active recommendations in the IBES Detailed US Recommendations 
database with at least one being revised during the sample period. The sample excludes all stocks 
priced lower than $1 on the day before the recommendation revision date. Finally, a brokerage 
house enters into the sample in a given year if it employs at least one analyst who entered the 
sample. For each calendar year covered by the sample, the table shows the number of firms 
followed by analysts, number of analysts, and the number of brokerage firms. The remaining 
columns of the table present the mean and median numbers of analysts per brokerage firm and the 
number of analysts following each firm, respectively. The sample period is from November 1993 
to December 2005.  
 














Brokerages  Mean Median Mean  Median
              
1993  139 126  32  3.94  3  5.87  5 
1994  1,331 898  85  10.78  5  7.74  6 
1995  1,196 931  91  10.43  4  5.60  5 
1996  1,240 993 111  9.15  4  4.96  4 
1997  1,284 1,048  123 8.63  3  4.77 4 
1998  1,602 1,429  145  10.08  4  5.31 4 
1999  1,648 1,617  139  11.96  5  5.85 5 
2000  1,472 1,468  135  11.22  5  5.70 5 
2001  1,433 1,475  123  12.28  6  6.72 5 
2002  1,783 1,761  138  12.96  6  7.69 6 
2003  1,658 1,478  133  11.28  4  7.66 6 
2004  1,418 1,198  145 8.39  3  6.69 5 
2005  1,320 1,122  140 8.10  3  5.76 5 
             





Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns following Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (in %) following recommendation revisions. We characterize each revision as an 
upgrade or a downgrade by comparing the revised recommendation with the previous active recommendation for the stock by the revising 
analyst.  Within upgrades and downgrades, we further classify them into revisions that move towards the consensus and those that move 
away from it.  Consensus is the average of all outstanding recommendations with at least two analysts following the stock as of the day 
before the revision, excluding the revising analyst.  A revision is categorized as moving towards the consensus if the absolute value of 
deviation from consensus is larger for the new recommendation than for the old recommendation.  The abnormal return is the raw return 
minus the CRSP value-weighted index return.  Day 0 is the revision date and the other days in the column headings are the number of trading 
days from the revision date. The average returns reported in bold face are statistically significant at least at the five percent level (absolute 
value of t-statistics greater than 1.96). We use heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors to compute the t-statistics. 
The sample period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
  Number of  Number of Trading Days 
Recommendation  Revision  Observations 0 1 2  21  42  126 
             
Upgrades All      23,785  2.03 2.33 2.40 3.34 3.72 4.85 
               
 towards  consensus    11,211  1.88 2.19 2.25 3.34 3.87 5.06 
               
  away from consensus   12,108  2.14 2.42 2.50 3.34 3.59 4.78 
               
  towards – away from        -0.26 -0.23 -0.25  0.00  0.28  0.27 
               
                          
Downgrades All      25,470  -3.14 -3.33 -3.38 -3.78 -3.71 -3.45 
               
 towards  consensus    11,096  -2.31 -2.49 -2.61 -2.84 -2.89 -2.61 
               
  away from consensus   13,855  -3.84 -4.03 -4.04 -4.54 -4.32 -3.98 
             
  towards – away from      1.54 1.54 1.43 1.70 1.43 1.36 







Regressions Testing for Herding  
 
This table reports the estimates of the following regression: 
H t j i t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR , , , 1 , , , ) _ _ ( ) , ( ε + − × + × + = + − , 
where t is the forecast revision date, (, ) i ABR t t H + is the H-period abnormal return following the revision date, I is the indicator variable for 
upgrades() 1 I =+  and downgrades() 1 I = − ,  t j i rec New , , _  is the revised individual recommendation on date t and  ,1 _ it Con rec −  is the  
consensus recommendation the day before the revision, excluding the revising analyst’s recommendation. We estimate the regression 
coefficients and the standard errors using quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions. The sample period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:       Explanatory Variables    
Cumulative Return 
  N  I (=1 if up, -1 if down)  deviation from consensus  constant  R
2 
Days since Revision       coeff. (%)  t-stat  coeff. (%)  t-stat  coeff. (%)  t-stat    
             
0   49,255  2.05  14.579  0.75  9.151  -0.45  -5.566  0.110 
1   49,253  2.30  14.565  0.73  9.261  -0.41  -4.800  0.105 
2   49,246  2.39  14.669  0.70  9.504  -0.41  -4.472  0.099 
21   48,973  3.07  15.729  0.69  6.028  -0.08  -0.297  0.053 
42    48,584  3.31  15.729 0.70  4.213 0.10  0.237  0.036 






Regressions Testing for Herding: Upgrades vs. Downgrades 
 
This table reports the estimates of the following regression: 
 
) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR  
                                                              H t j i t j i t i t j i H dummy downgrade rec Con rec New d , , , , , 1 , , , _ ) _ _ ( ε + × − × + −  
where t is the forecast revision date, (, ) i ABR t t H + is the H-period abnormal return following the revision date, I is the indicator variable for 
upgrades() 1 I =+  and downgrades() 1 I = − ,  t j i rec New , , _  is the revised individual recommendation on date t,  ,1 _ it Con rec −  is the 
consensus recommendation the day before the revision excluding the revising analyst’s recommendation, and downgrade_dummyi,j,t equals 1 
for downgrades and 0 for upgrades.  We estimate the regression coefficients and the standard errors using quarterly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. The sample period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables   
Cumulative Return 
 N 
I (=1 if up,  




for downgrades   constant R
2 
Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%)  t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat   
                  
0   49,255  2.05  14.535  0.27  4.551  0.90  5.972  -0.22  -3.738  0.113 
1   49,253  2.30  14.535  0.24  3.371  0.91  5.924  -0.17  -2.706  0.107 
2   49,246  2.39  14.628  0.27  3.444  0.79  4.933  -0.21  -2.820  0.101 
21   48,973  3.08  15.568  0.17  1.064  0.99  3.868  0.17  0.655  0.055 
42   48,584  3.31  15.489  0.15  0.768  1.06  3.565  0.37  0.945  0.037 




Cross Sectional Variation in Herding 
 
This table reports the estimates of the following cross sectional regression: 
                                  ) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR  
                                                t j i t i t j i H dummy char rec Con rec New d , , 1 , , , _ ) _ _ ( × − × + − H t j i t j i H dummy char I e , , , , , _ ε + × × +  
where t is the forecast revision date, (, ) i ABR t t H + is the H-period abnormal return following the revision date, I is the indicator variable for 
upgrades() 1 I =+  and downgrades() 1 I = − ,  t j i rec New , , _  is the revised individual recommendation on date t and  ,1 _ it Con rec −  is the 
consensus recommendation the day before the revision excluding the revising analyst’s recommendation .  The  t j i dummy char , , _  in Panel A  
equals 1 if the analyst has more than three years of experience, and zero otherwise; in Panel B it equals 1 if the number of analysts employed 
by the brokerage is one of the top 20 the previous year, and zero otherwise; in Panel C it equals 1 if the standard deviation of the consensus 
recommendation prior to the revision is greater than 0.75, which is the average dispersion in the sample. We obtain the regression estimates 
using quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions. The sample period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
 
Panel A: Analyst Experience 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables   
Cumulative Return 
 N 
    I (=1 if up,  








Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat   
                      
0    39,383 2.56  18.404 0.90  6.179 0.00  0.005  -0.19  -1.912  -0.56  -5.795  0.133 
1    39,381 2.89  18.252  0.89 6.556 -0.03  -0.219 -0.22  -2.252 -0.51  -4.958  0.128 
2    39,374 2.99  18.161 0.81  6.590 0.04  0.265  -0.22  -1.980  -0.51  -4.596  0.120 
21    39,119 3.77  15.996 0.80  4.118 0.12  0.412  -0.35  -1.572  -0.13  -0.360  0.065 
42    38,747 4.04  13.561 0.80  3.029 0.14  0.383  -0.39  -1.285 0.15  0.298  0.044 
126      36,758 4.27  6.744 1.01  1.661 0.48  0.590  -0.68  -1.056 0.58  0.486  0.022  
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Table 5 ⎯ Continued 
 
Panel B: Broker Size  
 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables   
Cumulative Return 
 N 
    I (=1 if up,  




*top 20 broker   I*top 20 broker  constant  R
2 
Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat   
                   
0   49,255  1.74  13.009 0.56  7.288  0.37  2.893 0.60  6.406 -0.46  -5.767  0.116 
1   49,253  2.01  13.068 0.56  6.481  0.31  2.239 0.58  5.369 -0.42  -5.028  0.110 
2   49,246  2.10  13.005 0.53  6.373  0.31  2.260 0.57  5.050 -0.42  -4.650  0.104 
21   48,973  2.78  11.981 0.60  3.904  0.14  0.581 0.58  2.765 -0.09  -0.330  0.056 
42   48,584 3.04  10.535 0.55 2.231  0.19  0.595 0.51  1.629 0.08 0.211  0.039 
126      46,418 3.78  7.806 0.48 0.965  0.60  0.901 -0.11 -0.184 0.22 0.242  0.021 
 
 
Panel C: Pre-Revision Dispersion  
 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables   
Cumulative Return 
 N 
    I (=1 if up,  








dispersion constant  R
2 
Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat   
                   
0   49,255  2.13%  14.015 0.88%  9.587  -0.30%  -3.439 -0.19%  -2.114 -0.45%  -5.575  0.113 
1   49,253  2.45%  13.622 0.82%  9.157  -0.21%  -2.042 -0.35%  -3.148 -0.41%  -4.804  0.108 
2   49,246  2.55%  13.930 0.80%  9.090  -0.21%  -1.815 -0.38%  -3.176 -0.41%  -4.501  0.102 
21   48,973  3.28%  14.065 0.75%  5.347  -0.14%  -1.005 -0.46%  -2.327 -0.08%  -0.291  0.055 
42   48,584  3.40%  12.009 0.99% 4.534  -0.67% -2.716 -0.20%  -0.610 0.10% 0.238  0.038 





This table estimates average herding across multiple recommendation revisions for 
various sub-samples.  Panel A excludes all revisions made within a window three days before and 
three days after the earnings announcement dates, panel B includes only those revisions that are 
made at least five days after the most recent revision made by a different analyst, and panel C 
excludes revisions that move across the consensus recommendation level.  All specifications are 
based on quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions where the coefficient and t-stats are based on time-
series averages and standard errors and require at least two analysts with active recommendations 
before the revision.  The sample period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
Panel A:  Exclude revisions made within a seven-day window around earnings announcement dates 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables    
Cumulative Return 
 N 
   I (=1 if up, 
 -1 if down) 
deviation from 
consensus constant  R
2 
Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%)  t-stat    
                  
0    36,172  1.83 14.406  0.73  8.711  -0.46 -5.033 0.101
1    36,170  2.07 14.153  0.70  8.491  -0.40 -4.243 0.096
2    36,163  2.17 13.940  0.66  8.886  -0.41 -4.199 0.091
21    35,920  2.83 14.535  0.67  4.594  -0.20 -0.801 0.047
42    35,633 2.96  13.240 0.69  3.207 0.18  0.482 0.032
126      34,086  3.39 7.784  0.84 2.013  0.30 0.329 0.018
 
Panel B: Revisions made at least five days after the most recent revision by a different analyst 
                  
0    34,022  2.11 14.746  0.70  7.746  -0.49 -4.963 0.116
1    34,020  2.36 14.469  0.69  7.335  -0.44 -4.360 0.112
2    34,017  2.45 14.825  0.68  8.522  -0.45 -4.092 0.106
21    33,839  3.13 14.907  0.64  4.634  -0.02 -0.071 0.055
42    33,561 3.29  14.963 0.61  2.876 0.22  0.500 0.037
126      32,024  3.51 7.544  0.72 1.615  0.34 0.363 0.019
 
Panel C: Exclude Revisions moving across the consensus recommendation level 
                  
0    27,797  2.09 13.912  0.72  8.989  -0.55 -5.889 0.113
1    27,797  2.37 14.210  0.69  8.929  -0.53 -5.300 0.109
2    27,792  2.45 14.174  0.67  9.028  -0.53 -5.018 0.103
21    27,621  3.16 16.128  0.66  5.652  -0.30 -1.102 0.057
42    27,384  3.39 14.774  0.68  3.837  -0.13 -0.309 0.040
126      26,146  3.74 8.522  0.80 1.986  0.27 0.291 0.021 
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Table 7 
Herding and Recommendation Levels 
This table reports the estimates of the following cross sectional regression: 
) _ _ ( ) , ( 1 , , , − − × + × + = + t i t j i H H H i rec Con rec New c I b a H t t ABR H t j i t j i H t j i H StrongBuy e StrongSell Sell d , , , , , , , _ ε + × + × +        
where t is the forecast revision date, (, ) i ABR t t H + is the H-period abnormal return following the revision date, I is the indicator variable for 
upgrades() 1 I =+  and downgrades() 1 I =− ,  t j i rec New , , _  is the revised individual recommendation on date t and  ,1 _ it Con rec −  is the 
consensus recommendation the day before the revision excluding the revising analyst’s recommendation.  t j i StrongSell Sell , , _  is a dummy 
variable equal to1 if the new recommendation is a sell or a strong sell and 0 otherwise, and  t j i StrongBuy , ,  is a dummy variable equal to1 if the 
new recommendation is a strong buy and 0 otherwise. We obtain the regression estimates using quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions. The sample 
period is November 1993 to December 2005. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:      Explanatory Variables   
Cumulative Return 
 N 
    I (=1 if up,  
         -1 if down) 
deviation from 
consensus 
dummy for  
sell / strong sell 
dummy for  
strong buy  constant  R
2 
Days since Revision      coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat  coeff. (%) t-stat coeff.  (%) t-stat   
                  
0   49,255 2.09% 14.451 0.86%  7.864 0.76% 2.107  -0.51%  -3.864  -0.35% -5.030  0.113 
1   49,253 2.34% 14.324 0.80%  7.619 0.42% 1.190  -0.40%  -2.933  -0.31% -4.010  0.108 
2   49,246 2.42% 14.132 0.75%  7.465 0.37% 1.075  -0.30%  -1.998  -0.33% -4.010  0.102 
21    48,973 3.10% 15.315  0.66%  4.299 -0.27% -0.448 -0.27% -0.662 -0.04%  -0.165 0.057 
42    48,584 3.35% 15.294  0.76%  3.418 -0.20% -0.248 -0.46% -0.814  0.13%  0.321 0.040 
126      46,418 3.92% 10.412  1.27%  2.118 -1.71% -1.120 -1.88% -1.458  0.58%  0.653 0.025 
 